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THE COURT BETWEEN HEGEMONIES
L.A. PowE, JR.*
As a sitting Justice, Lewis Powell was a quintessential centrist. He
found the center almost immediately with his three paragraph concurring
opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes,' and he occupied it so thoroughly that
when he retired the prevailing but erroneous assumption was that if his
replacement differed, then abortion and affirmative action were constitu-
tional history.2 Yet not only was Powell a centrist, his time on the Court,
too, was a centrist era, perched between the mid-century nationalism that
began with the New Deal's 1937 revolution and the conservative orthodoxy
established by the inability of liberal Justices to outlive both their own and
the following eras. To be sure, I am using a somewhat imprecise instrument
of measurement because history seldom offers the perfect break such as
that marked by Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. Nevertheless, with
this caveat, it remains that the bulk of Powell's service came between eras
marked first by a nationalist and then by a statist hegemony.
From 1937 to 1973, the Court was overwhelmingly nationalist, first
sustaining whatever the federal government did and then eradicating local
differences in the ways governments treated their citizens. Within the passing
of a decade and a half a new indelibly statist hegemony formed. The
nationalist hegemony had genuflected only to national power; the new statist
hegemony bows to any governmental power no matter how wielded. In
between was the era of "rootless activism ' 3 where the center of the Court
attempted largely to maintain the status quo while differing blocs of Justices
tugged it in opposite directions. While Powell's opinions contributed to each
of these eras-the nationalization of feminism, the cautious balancing of
affirmative action, the demand for respect of local institutions-he, like the
centrist era in which he served the longest, seems best characterized for
believing that a little bit of government involvement everywhere is not a
constitutional wrong, but too much may be.4 This is not a tidy summation
of an era, but then rootless, centrist decision making is not tidy either.
* Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas. I would like to thank my
colleagues Douglas Laycock and Michael Sturley, and Tom Krattenmaker of Georgetown Law
Center for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that while First Amendment
protections do not relieve reporters of their obligation to testify regarding criminal charges
before grand jury, courts must balance First Amendment protections against society's interest
in criminal adjudication to determine whether society's interest in each case is genuine and
pressing enough to displace First Amendment).
2. L. A. Powe, Jr., From Bork to Souter, 27 WumLTE L. REv. 781, 785 (1991).
3. Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT
198 (Vincent Blasi ed.,1983).
4. The characterization was offered to me by my colleague Douglas Laycock. See infra
note 149.
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I
Even more than the Civil War Amendments left prior constitutional
history in its own era, the New Deal revolution created an abrupt consti-
tutional demarcation. 5 What went before was legally irrelevant. Its function
came to be that of a measuring rod to mark change. Before the revolution
the commerce power did not reach the coal industry.6 After the revolution
it attached to wheat grown for home consumption. 7 That's a switch, so
much so that Justice Jackson, who had been on both sides, first as the
administration's lawyer, then as a justifying Justice, wondered in a memo
whether the Court had any future function at all if federal authority were
sustained.'
There turned out to be ample business for the Court even after it
stopped interfering with legislative efforts to regulate the economy. Civil
liberties and civil rights could and would be championed much as economic
liberties had been prior to 1937. These in turn, fueled by the powerful
promise of revolution inherent in Brown,9 developed an increasingly pow-
erful constituency in the North, which, with the 1960 and especially the
1964 elections, came into political dominance nationally. With that protective
(and supportive) umbrella, the Court began imposing its vision of national
values.' 0 The purpose of constitutional law would hereafter increasingly be
to eradicate what was different or backward, with the intent to replace it
with what any right-thinking Ivy League graduate would believe.
The South, necessarily and properly, would be a huge loser. Its dis-
tinctiveness was etched by the poisoning of its institutions by segregation,
and the Court's assault (tempered somewhat by Watts and Harlem in
demonstration cases) never let up." But rural Americans and those who did
not belong to mainstream-liberal Protestant or Jewish denominations were
also fit candidates for improvement. The same could be said for antiquated
criminal justice systems where values and procedures were mired in the era
of the Wickersham Commission.
12
5. BRUCE AcKER.mAN, WE THE PEOPLE 47-50 (1991). I agree fully with Bruce Ackerman's
view that constitutional theorists must have a more adequate explanation than an overdue
restoration of Marshallian jurisprudence for the changes that occurred beginning with West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Id. at 154-55.
6. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that Congressional power
to regulate interstate commerce does not extend to regulation of production conditions).
7. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that commerce power applies to
regulation of wheat grown wholly for private consumption).
8. AIPHEus THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PIjAR OF TEm LAw 594 (1956).
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Robert C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 8 CONsT.
CommmrrARY 11, 14-16 (1991).
11. A startling exception to the Court's assault on segregation was jury peremptory
challenges. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
12. The presidentially appointed National Commission on Law Observance and Enforce-
ment presented Congress with a fourteen volume report in 1931. The gist of the Report was
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Nothing so represented the nationalizing trend of the Court than its
transformation of desegregation into integration. Arguably, the switch came
in Green v. County School Board1 3 when the Court struck down freedom
of choice desegregation plans and demanded a plan that promised "realis-
tically to work ... now." 14 In the two-school, rural New Kent County
district the way to adopt such a plan was clear, and the inference of
subterfuge equally as clear, but in an urban district, with its residential
segregation, it would not be so easy.
After some initial fticker shock, 5 the real switch came in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg16 where the Court affirmed a massive, almost bus
to balance, order issued by a district judge fed up with a footdragging
school system. There was no other way to fully integrate an urban system,
and seventeen years after Brown so many opinions had issued and so little
integration had occurred, the Court was frustrated with continuing southern
intransigence.1 7 The busing order, first for Charlotte and then for other
southern cities, changed the composition of southern schools almost over-
night.
Chief Justice Warren blamed rural voters for the plight of urban
America,' and with the reapportionment decisions, he stripped them of
their undeserved political power both in the Congress and the states. After
a misstep in upholding Blue Laws (on the quaint theory that retaining
Sunday for a day of rest had nothing to do with Christianity), 9 the Court
banned prayer2° and Bible-reading21 from the public schools to the howls
of more culturally conservative religions. 22 But that was .not their sole defeat.
Roth v. United Statesl had begun the eradication of Victorian laws on
that "police violence and the 'third degree" were flourishing. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 445 (1966).
13. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Court acknowledged that Green had marked a change in
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo. 413 U.S. 189, 200-01 n.11 (1973).
14. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
15. ROBERT WOODWARD & ScoTr AxmTSmoNo, Tam BRamiEN 95-111 (1979).
16. Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that
district courts have broad powers to fashion desegregation remedies for public schools).
17. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Road to Swann: Mobile County Crawls to the Bus, 51 Tax.
L. REa. 505 (1973).
18. BERNARm ScHwARTz, SuPmi CaimF 507-08 (1983).
19. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). McGowan was a precursor of the
conclusion in the 1980s that with enough reindeer and elves present, a creche is secular, too.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
21. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that First
Amendment prohibits states from requiring Bible passages to be read or Lord's Prayer to be
recited at start of school day).
22. See PAuL L. MuRHY, THE CONSTITUTION ix Ciusis TIsaS 392 (1972) (quoting
Representative William Andrews of Alabama as saying: "They put the Negroes in the schools.
Now they have driven God out.").
23. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (stating that sex and obscenity are not synonymous and that
obscenity is that which treats sex in manner appealing to prurient interests).
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pornography; the 1966 Trilogy 4 appeared to be the clean sweep of sexual
promiscuity. Finally, over the opposition of police forces everywhere, the
Court federalized police procedures. 25 And believing, probably not without
reason, that state courts would be unreceptive to the new national vision,
the Court refashioned federal habeas to allow direct federal judicial super-
vision of state court processes. 26 Finally, during one of the Justices' periodic
tests of their political acumen, the Court struck down the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia,27 secure in the knowledge that public opinion would
never authorize its reinstatement.
Surprising as it seems in retrospect, the Court's nationalizing trends
during the 1960s were oblivious to the rebirth of the women's movement.
Jurisprudence remained unchanged from Frankfurter's incredible opinion in
Goessert v. Clearys that any discrimination against women (or for them,
for that matter, although it is difficult to so read the Michigan law) made
sense and, therefore, was constitutional. The Court added its own update
in Hoyt v. Florida9 when it sustained a law allowing all women to avoid
jury service. By 1970 the perception of the appropriate role of women in
society had changed so drastically that both Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon supported the Equal Rights Amendment, which sailed through the
House of Representatives 350 to 15, only to falter in the Senate over whether
the ERA meant that women, too, had to be drafted. 0 After the new
Congress assembled, the ERA was again introduced and swiftly secured
House passage. On March 22, 1972, it passed the Senate, was sent to the
states, and before the day was over had its first ratification of the thirty it
would get in less than a year.
3'
24. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (establishing three part test for
determining obscenity); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (finding books designed
for and primarily disseminated to clearly defined deviant sexual group to be obscene); Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (holding that publications which were represented to be
erotically arousing and commercially exploited for the purpose of prurient appeal were obscene
even if they were not obscene).
25. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by
unconstitutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in state criminal trial); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding that statement made by criminal suspect who has been
refused opportunity to consult with counsel and who has not been apprised of his right to
remain silent may not be used against accused at trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment requires accused to be informed of his right to remain
silent, right to have counsel present, and right to have counsel appointed if unable to afford
his own).
26. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
27. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that death penalty in cases at bar would be cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
28. 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (holding that Michigan statute prohibiting all women except
wives and daughters of male owners of bars from bartending did not violate Equal Protection
clause).
29. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
30. JANE MANSBRIDE, Wny WE LosT TH ERA 10-11 (1986).
31. See id. at 12 (recounting events surrounding 1972 passage of ERA by Senate and
submission to states).
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The Court, never uninfluenced by the strong intellectual currents of its
time and subject to effective lobbying within the confines of the Justices'
homes by strong-minded spouses and daughters, jumped on the bandwagon.
In Reed v. Reed,32 for the first time in the post-1937 era, the Court
invalidated a law that classified on the basis of what had been prevailing
gender stereotypes. Reed paled into insignificance as the Court voted later
that Term, five to two, to constitutionalize the law of abortion.3 This
adopted the cornerstone of the women's movement and, given dicta in
Griswold v. Connecticut 4 plus the recent decision upholding the District of
Columbia's criminal abortion statute, 35 it would be a shock. Chief Justice
Burger, who probably was a dissenter, first tried to have the case set aside
until Powell and Rehnquist arrived and then assigned the case to Blackmun
(who at the time was known as the junior member of the "Minnesota
twins" and was the Justice least able to produce timely work). Late in the
Term when Blackmun finally did circulate his opinion, pressure from Burger
caused him to withdraw it, resulting in the case being set for reargument
before the full Court. One can imagine Burger's surprise when the result
held, this time by a seven to two margin (six to three if one counts the
Chief's vote as an unrecorded dissent).
36
II
Roe v. Wade 7 finally came down on January 22, 1973. Before the
following summer, the Court decided three significant cases that helped
bracket a transition between eras: Frontiero3s failed to equate gender dis-
crimination with racial discrimination by a single vote; Rodriguez39 let stand
Texas' local property tax funding for public schools; Keyes4° moved school
integration into the North. Together with Roe, these cases offered different
32. 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (holding law granting preference to man when woman
equally qualified for appointment as estate administrator invalid).
33. See WooDwARD & ARmSTRONG, supra note 15, at 169-70.
34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 67 (1971) (holding that abortion statute
prohibiting abortion absent risk to mother's life or health was not unconstitutionally vague).
36. WOODWARD & ARmSTRONG, supra note 15, at 165-89.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that Texas statute prohibiting abortion violated woman's
constitutional right to privacy, including right to terminate her pregnancy, under Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
38. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that federal statute placing
burden only on women and not on men to obtain benefits for their spouses solely for
administrative convenience violated Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
39. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that Texas
system of school district financing bears rational relationship to legitimate state purpose of
assuring basic education for every child and is not violative of Equal Protection Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).
40. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (concluding
intentional segregation in one area justifies presumption that segregation elsewhere is also
intentional).
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views of two highly charged fields. Roe and Keyes significantly extended
constitutional doctrine. By their advances, they looked backward to the era
that was passing and would be gone by the end of the 1973 Term. Rodriguez
and Frontiero refused to advance and thereby looked forward, ushering in
a new era largely dedicated to the constitutional status quo.
The Court's embrace of women's rights in Roe had come as that era
of feminism was reaching its peak. Shortly thereafter in Frontiero, with the
Equal Rights Amendment being voted on in the states and still looking like
a cinch, the Court faced the question of whether to hold gender discrimi-
nation to what was perceived, in the period before affirmative action, to
be the standard for race: virtual per se unconstitutionality. Four Justices
were ready to do just that and thereby moot the ratification process on the
ERA. Indeed, they went so far as to cite the pending ERA as an example
of Congress concluding that "classifications based upon sex are inherently
invidious," and to argue that determination by "a coequal branch of
Government is not without significance" to the constitutional question
before the Court!4' Powell's concurring opinion took a more modest view
of the Congressional adoption of ERA:
By acting prematurely and unnecessarily ... the Court has assumed
a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures,
functioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating
the proposed Amendment.... [R]eaching out to pre-empt by ju-
dicial action a major political decision which is currently in process
of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed
legislative processes. 42
The result-that the statutory classification was unconstitutional, but under
a lower level of review than strict scrutiny-allowed the legislative process
to continue to its surprising conclusion.
One can contrast the refusal of Frontiero to go forward with Swann,
where, among its conclusions, the Court had stated that urban housing
follows schools, and, thus, the location of segregated schools affects housing
segregation.43 This conclusion, which could be offered and believed only by
old men cloaked in black robes, 44 necessarily pointed North where housing
patterns were, if anything, more segregated than in the South. If the location
of schools, an indisputable government function, created housing segrega-
tion, could the North be immune from the powerful nationalizing demand
for integration? The answer on the one hand was no. Integration was a
value that knew no legal boundaries; thus, in 1967, in its sole major
northern case, the Court wiped out the retrograde attempt by California
41. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687-88.
42. Id. at 692.
43. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).
44. Eleanor P. Wolf, Northern School Desegregation and Residential Choice, 1977 Sup.
Or. REv. 63 (concluding that reasoning of courts on entire issue of relationship between school
and residential segregation is illogical and confused).
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voters to repeal their state open housing law.45 On the other hand, Northern
states had not mandated segregation by law, a distinction of no small
constitutional import. Furthermore, moving busing into the ethnic neigh-
borhoods of the North was a huge step even for a Court accustomed to
lengthy constitutional strides.
Yet when Keyes posed the issue, it turned out that a solid majority (all
but Burger and Rehnquist) was ready to give the North the benefits it had
bestowed on the South. The Court held that when a trial judge found
intentional segregation in one area of a school district, any segregation
anywhere else in that district is presumed (rebuttably in theory, although
probably not in fact) to have been caused also by intentional segregation.
And intentional segregation was to be remedied in the North, just as in the
South, with busing if necessary.
Powell's separate opinion was more forthright than Brennan's neces-
sarily (to hold his Court) bland majority opinion. Furthermore, one cannot
help feeling the passion Powell felt about the national double standard on
school desegretation. "Swann imposed obligations on southern school dis-
tricts to eliminate conditions which are not regionally unique but are similar
both in origin and effect to conditions [everywhere else]. . . ."4 Powell
noted that "[u]nwilling and footdragging as the process was in most places,
substantial progress toward achieving integration has been made in Southern
States." 47 But not in the North. "[I]f our national concern is for those who
attend such schools, . . . we must recognize that the evil of operating
separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta."
48
Having equated North with South generally (and accurately except for
the South's obvious problem of original sin), Powell offered the first of his
two-Bake 49 would be the second-imaginative compromises of the decade.
He would massively add to the requirement of desegregation and save the
parties and the district judges the effort of attempting to prove some
boundary line had been drawn or school sited with an illegal intent. But,
in return, busing would be out as a remedy. Any other remedy would be
available, but the outside influence of the federal judiciary could not tear
a school system apart by the inevitably divisive busing order.
It was an imaginative compromise, one which, based on subsequent
events, the Court would have been well advised to make because of its
good sense and the recognition of political limitations on judicial imple-
mentation of social planning. However, the majority was having none of
it. The South had opposed Brown and eventually had been forced to swallow
major institutional changes. Now it was the North's turn. The Court had
placed an unparalleled power in the hands of northern federal judges.
45. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (reading repeal of antidiscrimination laws
by state constitutional amendment as creating constitutional right to discriminate).
46. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 223.
47. Id. at 218 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 218-19 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
49. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Because virtually every city had pockets of single-race schools, Keyes was
a roadmap for willing district judges who could, seemingly at their own
discretion, decide the future of each and every school system. Yet there is
a quality of deflection to Brennan's solution. Rather than take the North
wholesale, he took it retail; unlike Powell's compromise, Brennan required
northern districts to be picked off one at a time. Politically, that might be
a strength. It was possible that intense local hostility to busing might never
materialize in the North as it had in the South because different communities
would find themselves in court at different times. Nevertheless, the terms
of the debate on busing said not a single word about educational quality.
What a court order promised to white parents was a bus ride to a far-away
school in what would be a deteriorating school system. Busing orders became
inseparable from opposition to judicial intervention.
The confidence of Keyes contrasts with the modesty of Rodriguez,
50
and the latter, not the former, was to be the forerunner of decisions to
come. The Court, by a five to four vote, refused to enter the fray over
inequalities in the funding of public schools flowing from the accident of
wealth: the amount of taxable property within the school district. 5' Rodriguez
had a number of distinct holdings. First, wealth (and therefore poverty)
was not a suspect classification. Second, education was not a fundamental
right. Third, reliance on property taxes coupled with very mild state funding
(basically an incentive matching with more funding going to the already
healthy districts) was not irrational.
Powell's opinion stated that the Court should not be seen as "placing
its judicial imprimatur on .the [funding] status quo." '52 Maybe, but the
opinion did embrace the legal status quo. Frank Michelman's imaginative
Harvard foreword, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,5 3 just five years old and once perceived as being on the cutting edge
of social and legal change, had been mortally wounded by Dandridge v.
Williams54 and United States v. Kras;5s Rodriguez officially finished it off.
The fundamental rights theories fared no better, although Powell's efforts
to make fundamental rights a closed class had a hollow ring to it coming
just two months after Roe. But as a promise never to do it again it was
more comprehensible and reflected the Court's intent.56 There were also
statements of judicial modesty unseen (with the exception of Dandridge) in
50. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 58.
53. 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 7 (1969).
54. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that Maryland regulation limiting amount of welfare
grant did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
55. 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (holding that statutory requirement of payment of filing fees as
condition of bankruptcy discharge did not deny indigents equal protection).
56. The Court, by a 5-4 vote, yielded slightly to find a grandmother could live with her
two grandsons when they were merely cousins and not brothers, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), but drew a firm line at sodomy, see infra note 91.
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years. These were combined with Powell's view, which he would articulate
again in Keyes, of the importance of localism in making educational
decisions.
All in all, Rodriguez was the embrace of the constitutional status quo.
It did not cut back, but it resolutely refused to cut new ground. While it
is obviously impossible for a changing band of Justices to hold still for
years on end, Rodriguez set a tone that would be echoed again and again
over the subsequent decade, especially in gender discrimation, religion, and
criminal procedure. Even when the Court was forced to eat a little crow
once on the post-Rodriguez education-poverty issue-by concluding that
Texas could not create a permanent underclass of illiterates by its refusal
to enroll children of illegal aliens in the public schools unless their parents
came up with the full costs of their schooling-Powell's concurring opinion
underscored the limited fare: he wished "to emphasize the unique character
of the ease] ..... ,,s7
III
Rodriguez set the tone, but Roe,58 center of a firestorm of criticism,
was the catalyst. The Justices, and especially Blackmun, were flooded with
mail, labelling them child killers, sometimes with references to the Butchers
at Dachau.5 9 Creating a comparison that would also last, Texas filed a
petition for rehearing comparing Roe to the infamous Dred Scott"o decision. 61
Whatever the political justifications for legalizing abortion, there was more
than ample reason for the critics' attack on the Court.
With excessive medical discussion, an obviously brokered legislative
determination on trimesters, plus almost complete exclusion of the sources
of constitutional law, Blackmun's opinion for the Court is probably the
weakest of any major decision in American history. As Mark Tushnet so
aptly commented, maybe Roe v. Wade is the entering wedge of Cubist legal
"reasoning. ' 62 Surprisingly, with every Justice knowing this was a major
57. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). He wasn't kidding
either. A year later he wrote for the Court in Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983),
sustaining facially a Texas law denying tuition-free education to minors who live apart from
their parents or guardians if the minor's presence in the school district is "for the primary
purpose of attending the public free schools." Id. at 321. The plaintiff was a U.S. citizen of
Mexican parents who at the age of eight returned to Texas to live with his sister in order to
attend public schools. Id. at 322-23.
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. WooDwARD & ARmmASoNG, supra note 15, at 239.
60. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
61. 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
62. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 H.&Av. L. REv. 781, 821 (1983). Tushnet stated:
[C]onsider the craft of "writing novels." Its practice includes Trollope writing The
Eustace Diamonds, Joyce writing Finnegan's Wake, and Mailer writing The Execu-
tioner's Song. We might think of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe as an innovation
akin to Joyce's or Mailer's. It is the totally unreasoned judicial opinion. To say that
19921
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case, neither Rehnquist nor White in dissent took advantage of Roe's void
in legal reasoning to write the dissent that a major case deserves. That
honor fell to John Hart Ely, a young liberal academic at Yale who rushed
into print with a biting commentaryO that has never been improved upon.
Thereafter, other liberals, most notably Laurence Tribe 4 and Michael Perry,6
attempted time after time to find a constitutional justification for abortion.
Eventually, on sort of an adverse possession theory of constitutional law,
the search for a rationale stopped and Roe became, for most liberals, a
constitutional given, just as if the due process clause actually mentioned
privacy and abortion. But the united liberal front that supported and
justified the other nationalizing opinions did not immediately provide Roe
with protective cover. Conservative opposition could not only attack the
result, but also note that leading liberal academics found the result and
opinion unjustifiable.
The Court, of course, had known that abortion was a hot political
issue. But the Court had been there so many times before. Southerners
disliked Brown. National security conservatives could never tolerate letting
a pink, much less a red, go free. Police organizations felt similarly about
criminals, and the Court's criminal procedure decisions, especially Miranda,
had been targets of Richard Nixon's successful 1968 presidential campaign.
Even the State Chief Justices had briefly weighed in against the Court in
the late 1950s. But the decisions on busing and abortion brought an
immediacy and a generalizeability to Court criticisms that had theretofore
been lacking. Unintentionally, between them Roe and Keyes closed the
nationalizing era that had begun over a third of a century earlier.
The certainty that there was but one true course for constitutional law
dissipated. Opinions became more homogenized (law clerks taking the
responsibilities and having the same backgrounds), offering up a multi-part
doctrinal test6 that wound up as balancing. 67 Lengthy, ponderous, unaesth-
it does not look like Justice Powell's decision in some other case is like saying that
a Cubist "portrait" does not look like its subject as a member of the Academy
would paint it.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing Roe v. Wade as unsupported by constitutional text, history, or
doctrine).
64. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward
a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAgv. L. Rav. 1 (1973) (stating
that religious controversy surrounding abortion supports allocation selected by Court) with
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMErCAN CO NSTrrUTIONAL LAW 928 (1st ed. 1978) (stating that Roe
properly rests on fundamental personal right of reproductive autonomy).
65. Compare Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 71 Nw. U. L. Rv. 417 (1976) (stating that Court following conventional morality
justifies Roe) with MICHAEL J. PERRY, Ti CO NSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HumA RI;HTs
(1982) (stating that Court, using own views of morality, and properly behaving as Prophet
justifies Roe).
66. See ROBERT NAGEL, CONSTrrtrrIONAL CULTURES ch. 7, "The Formulaic Constitution"
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etic, with virtually all traces of individuality suppressed, these opinions made
reading the Court's work tedious. In David Currie's apt words, "one can
rapidly have one's fill of debating whether the government's interest in
doing A outweighs the burden thereby imposed on B." 68 Balancing resulted
in few extensions from the prior era, but few reversals as well. For more
than ten years the Court trod along in the status quo. To be sure, some
areas showed more change than others. Criminal defendants were almost
cinch losers where previously they won. But the landmarks of the nation-
alizing period were not overruled, and only rarely were they extended 69 as
the Court nibbled away at the margins. Other areas hardly changed. Thus,
busing continued, but without enthusiasm and without extension.
As befits a centrist Court, the Justices themselves were split with
Brennan and Marshall consistently 0 looking backward to the era of their
appointments and Rehnquist and Burger looking ahead to the era that would
begin shortly after the latter's retirement. In between were the centrists,
Powell and Stewart, and to a lesser extent White. Centrist decisionmaking
on a divided Court produces strained and strange results.71 Nowhere is this
better illustrated than with death and religion.
When Furman invalidated all the capital punishment statutes in the
country, the Court required legislators to do what the Court itself just a
year earlier7 3 had said was impossible: provide written guidance for juries
to assist them in the choice of life or death. The Justices did not believe
legislatures would take them up on it, not because of impossibility, but
rather because, in the enlightened society in which they were living, capital
punishment was a relic from a bygone era.74 The only problem with the
political prognostication was that it was completely wrong. If the Court
(1989) (discussing Supreme Court's use of formulaic style in opinions to explicate constitutional
jurisprudence).
67. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987) (examining "balancing" approach as form of constitutional reasoning).
68. DAVID CuEIRm, THE CONSTrUnON N THE SUPREME CouRT: THE SEcoND CENTURY
598 (1990).
69. The exception that jumps to mind is the extension of Miranda in Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that use of criminal defendant's confession at trial violated his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights even though defendant responded to police-initiated
interrogation after being advised of rights, because defendant had invoked right to have counsel
present).
70. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (where they split). See infra note 109
(discussing dissent in Bellotti in which Brennan and Marshall joined).
71. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802
(1982) (observing that Court's natural operation will produce fractured and inconsistent
decisions).
72. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
73. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
74. That was Stewart's position, WooDwARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 218, and
there is no reason to believe it was limited to him. Marshall concluded that capital punishment
was "unnacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history." Furman,
408 U.S. at 360.
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demanded that juries be given guidance before a death penalty could be
constitutionally administered, then guidance it would be. So states tried the
easy way out, mandatory death penalties. A majority would not have that
either.75 It turned out that however bad discretion was, some discretion was
mandatory. Neither excessive discretion nor excessive rigidity was valid.
Appropriate discretion was valid.76 Thereafter, the Court lessened its super-
vision of the amount of discretion needed, 77 but the thread of decisions
throughout this period was to authorize capital punishment as a matter of
constitutional law while simultaneously making it difficult for the states to
carry out executions. If the results and opinions made little sense, fragmented
voting was one culprit. From 1971 until his retirement a decade later, Justice
Stewart was the law of capital punishment; he alone voted with the result
in each case. The area achieved "rationality" only after Powell's retirement,
when a majority formed which was willing for the first time to facilitate
procedures accommodating states' desires to execute their death row inmates.
The religion cases, in which the Court maintained a tripartite test from
Lemon v. Kurtzman,78 produced widely conflicting results in the parochiaid
cases that dominated the 1970s' docket. Nowhere has the job of ridiculing
the Court been better practiced than by Rehnquist:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may
lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend
a film on George Washington .... A State may pay for bus
transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus trans-
portation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural
history museum for a field trip.
79
No one, not even the few Justices controlling the results, could be happy
with such a laughable situation, but because the topic was religion it brought
out the worst in interest groups. One side, typically associated with the
American Civil Liberties Union, liberal Protestants, and Jews, wanted no
aid of any kind and saw any deviation as the beginning of a spiritual state.
The other, a strange coalition of Catholics wanting financial aid and
75. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that North Carolina's
death sentence for first-degree murder violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
76. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (holding that punishment of death
for murder did not, under all circumstances, violate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
77. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 305 (discussing series of
cases in 1982 Term in which Court prematurely announced it would no longer regulate way
in which states administer death penalty phase of capital murder cases).
78. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test considers whether there is a secular purpose
for the legislation, whether the primary purpose is to advance religion, and whether the
legislation results in excessive government entanglement.
79. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
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culturally conservative Protestants wanting school prayer, argued that the
Establishment Clause did not bar government aid to religion.
The parochiaid cases satisfied neither group of activists, but when the
Court broke out of that area and sustained a state's paying for a legislative
chaplain 0 and displaying a Nativity scene, 1 those wanting more religion in
public life were elated. Those decisions, however, were followed by Wallace
v. Jaffree, 2 where the Court invalidated a statute authorizing teachers to
announce a minute of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer." 3 In
summing it up, it seems impossible to improve on the observation of my
colleague Douglas Laycock:
The Court occasionally alludes to ... the theory that a little bit of
aid to religious schools is permissible, but it must be structured in
a way that keeps it from becoming too much. Indeed, this theory
may be generalizable in ways that explain other establishment clause
conundrums, such as the Court's approval of legislative chaplains
and municipal Nativity scenes: perhaps, in general, the Court be-
lieves that a little bit of government support for religion is unob-
jectionable 4
The middle way also was prevalent in gender discrimination cases.
Following the failed attempt to preempt the ERA in Frontiero, the Court
compromised on what was called intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren,8 5
a case remarkably like Cooley v. Board of Wardens 6 in that everyone could
join the compromise without giving up their intended outcomes. Thus, when
women were exempted from draft registration," the Court maintained its
overly deferential approach to all things military. Also by a pair of five-to-
four votes, the Court sustained statutory rape laws,88 while forbidding a
nursing school from excluding men.8 9
80. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
81. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
82. 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985).
83. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985).
84. Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Omo ST.
L.J. 409, 446 (1986).
85. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that teenagers get to drink at same age regardless of
gender and traffic statistics).
86. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (upholding state legislation for regulation of pilotage).
87. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that Congress acted within
constitutional authority when authorizing registration of men and not women under military
Selective Service Act).
88. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding constitutionality
of statutory rape law which limited liability to men alone).
89. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (determining that
excluding men from state-supported nursing school violates Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment).
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When the issue turned from discrimination to abortion, despite intense
political and public opposition as well as changing membership, Roe held.
Even more than in other sigificant areas, "holding" meant no new
movement either within the principle of privacy or the ability to obtain
abortions. Thus, the Court dealt blows to less affluent women who wished
to have governments fund their abortions instead of their deliveries.9
Nevertheless, the confirmation hearings on the retirements of Powell,
Brennan, and Marshall attested to Roe's ability, year after year, to hang
by a tenuous thread despite the Court's swiftly changing composition. It
seems unlikely, however, to survive much longer in the new era of
conservative hegemony.
Holding the line also meant that gays, increasingly out of the closet
and demanding the rights of first class citizenship, could not be accom-
modated within the constitution.91 Here Powell attempted a compromise,
not like Keyes and Bakke, but rather like that of Branzburg. The obvious
fifth vote for the majority, he joined the opinion of the Court, but wrote
a short concurring opinion with a slightly different rationale designed to
soften the blow. 92 Even more than his Branzburg concurrence, Powell's
effort in Bowers was irrelevant to the issue and the future, something
poignantly underscored by his post-retirement recanting of his vote.93
With race there were two huge refusals to go forward, coupled with
a seemingly cautious entry into the world of affirmative action. Keyes had
marked the flood tide of busing. A year later, in Milliken v. Bradley,94
the Court dealt busing a backhanded blow from which it could not recover.
Demographics and the availability of constitutionally protected private
schools 95 were leaving many urban school systems with fewer and fewer
white students. While one of Brown's companion cases had involved the
70% black Clarendon County, South Carolina,9 6 Green's97 switch from
desegregation to integration necessitated white children in the system.
District judges, first in Richmond and then in Detroit, had found the
needed white students in suburban school districts and entered busing
90. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(holding that Equal Protection Clause did not require state, through its Medicaid program, to
pay for nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women merely because it paid childbirth
expenses).
91. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that Georgia's sodomy statute
did not violate fundamental rights of homosexuals).
92. See id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing that Due Process Clause embodies
no substantive right to engage in consensual homosexual activity, but noting that sodomy
statute might fal on Eighth Amendment grounds).
93. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
5, 1990, at 3.
94. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding imposition of multidistrict remedy for single-district de
jure segregation improper in absence of findings that other included districts had failed to
operate unitary school systems or had committed acts that effected segregation).
95. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that Oregon Compulsory
Education Act requiring children to attend public schools violated Fourteenth Amendment).
96. Briggs v. Elliot, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); RIcHARD KLUGER, SwPLE JusicE 6 (1976).
97. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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orders bringing them into the inner city schools (and sending black students
out to the suburbs). The message, for those who were planning to engage
in white flight, was that there was no escape.
The Detroit district judge, after finding intentional segregation in the
Detroit schools and that any Detroit-only plan would still leave many
schools with 75-90% black students, combined Detroit with 53 suburban
districts involving an area the size of Delaware and almost tripling the
number of students. Before the order Detroit had been approaching 70%
black students; the new district was 75% white. By a five-to-four vote the
Court reversed, finding the massive remedy incommensurate with the
constitutional violation in Detroit alone. Whether or not the Court knew
it, Milliken set busing on a lengthy course to minimization. Urban America
had too few whites within its school systems and Milliken held that if
they moved, they could not be recaptured by a busing order. Given the
massive unpopularity of busing, there was little doubt what would happen.
Still, district judges kept ordering busing into the 1980s and the Court
affirmed orders in Columbus98 and Dayton" and dismissed certiorari as
improvidently granted in Dallas, where the Fifth Circuit had set aside a
plan minimizing busing.'00
Keyes and the Detroit suburbs had implicitly raised the question of
what the Constitution said about governmental decisions having a disparate
adverse impact on minorities (when there was no intent to harm them).
In Washington v. Davis,10' the Court held that governmental action is not
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.
Thus, the fact that a test used by the District of Columbia police depart-
ment was failed more frequently by blacks than whites did not make use
of the test unconstitutional even though Title VII bars tests under some
(and often similar) circumstances. Had the decision come out otherwise,
Washington v. Davis would have necessitated a major restructuring of
American institutitions. Even the Court during its nationalizing era might
well have balked at such a decision.
With affirmative action, Powell offered his second major compromise
of the decade, and this time it was "accepted" if only because the other
eight were equally split. Powell's Bakke opinion rejected quotas but
allowed universities to take race into account as one factor in the admission
process. Universities embraced his solution even as it turned out to be
98. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
99. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (affirming court of appeals
ruling that plaintiffs, students in Dayton, Ohio, school system, had proved system-wide pattern
of intentional segregation which warranted system-wide remedy).
100. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1979). At the
Supreme Court I was counsel for the amicus Dallas Alliance, the tri-ethnic group that drafted
the district court's plan.
101. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that standards applicable to equal employment oppor-
tunity cases should not have been applied in resolving issue whether test violated Due Process
Clause, and that law is not unconstitutional solely because it has racially disproportionate
impact).
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impossible to implement. Taking race into account when grades and test
scores were significantly lower for minorities offered no guidance at all
toward the crucial question of how much race should count. This question
could only be answered by predetermined "goals" which, with experience,
became quotas. Those on the inside knew; those on the outside might,
like the New York Times, choose to bury their heads and not "know."'
02
The result, inevitably, was the Spring 1991 flap at Georgetown Law Center
where a student exposed the lower test scores of minorites and, in an
almost scripted response, the dean did Orwell proud by talking about
"other factors" which could help a minority, but not a white, gain
entrance. 03
After Bakke cases seemed to meander, although this stemmed, as so
much of the confusion from this era does, from the middle deciding which
of the two polar blocks would prevail in each dispute. The prototypical
affirmative action case was about jobs, and Powell and O'Connor voting
in the middle determined the propriety of a racial (or gender) preference
by their cost-benefit analysis, which ultimately looked to how severe the
costs were to the whites in terms of disrupting settled expectations.'1 4 This
was most clearly articulated by Powell in Wygant, where he noted that
"hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities, [but] layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving
racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disrup-
tion of their lives. That burden is too intrusive."'0 5
The two areas where the Court distanced itself most from the nation-
alizing period were in freedom of expression and the relation of the states
to the federal government. And yet even here the changes were incremental,
with nothing of the order of a Brown or Reynolds v. Sims or Swann or
Roe.
By the time the Court had decided Brandenburg,0 6 Watts, 07 Cohen,08
Rosenbloom,' 9 and the Pentagon Papers cases," 0 it was hardly an exag-
102. See N.Y. Twms, Apr. 18, 1991, at 24 (editorial swallowing whole Georgetown dean's
explanation); infra note 103.
103. Michael Marriott, Storm at Georgetown Law on Admissions, N.Y. Tnias, Apr. 16,
1991, at 14.
104. Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 189,
208 (1992).
105. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(footnote omitted).
106. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding unconstitutional statute forbidding
mere advocacy and assembly, for falling to distinguish mere advocacy from incitement to
imminent lawless action).
107. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (holding that defendant's statement, in
context of opposition to Vietnam War, "'if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want in my sights is L.B.J.,"' did not amount to threat against life of President).
108. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that state may not make mere
public display of offensive language criminal offense).
109. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (applying New York Times
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geration to state that Americans could say virtually anything they wished
without fear of sanction. In the centrist era the Court nibbled a bit and
took a fair bite when it came to sexuality."' Elite opinion on the problems
of both obscenity and pornography changed as did some of the Court's
doctrine, although the market for sexual materials and expression flour-
ished well beyond that of even the late 1960s. In two areas, commercial
speech and campaign finance, the Court went beyond prior protections.
But in one area, in case after case, the Court's doctrine made it increasingly
difficult for individuals to find appropriate forums. As a result, while
Americans can still say pretty much what they please, there are few places
where they may say it.
Until 1975112 the prevailing wisdom was that commercial advertising was
wholly without constitutional protection.1 Then the Court dramatically
constitutionalized the area, 114 eventually reaching the inevitable compromise
on its anesthetizing multipart test. 5 While there has been more agreement
among the Justices in this area than in highly politicized areas like abortion
and affirmative action, the results have, as with so many areas, pleased
few. Daniel Lowenstein summarizes the areas by stating that "the Court
has struck down every restriction of purely or predominently informational
advertising to come before it, whereas all or nearly all (depending on how
one classifies Central Hudson)116 restrictions of noninformational commercial
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard in state civil libel
action brought by private individual for defamatory falsehood uttered by radio station about
individual's involvement in event of public interest).
110. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing
to enjoin publication of contents of classified Viet Nam Study).
111. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (articulating obscenity standards);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that in narrow circumstances government
may restrict public broadcast of language that is indecent but not obscene); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (affirming statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting
sexual performance by child under age of 16 by distributing material depicting such perform-
ance); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding school's disruptive
conduct rule prohibiting obscene or profane language or gestures).
112. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that Virginia statute prohibiting
encouragement of abortion by sale or circulation of any publication infringed upon constitu-
tionally protected speech under First Amendment).
113. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that decision not to protect commercial speech was "casual, almost offhand");
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (denying
First Amendment protection to purely commercial advertising).
114. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (granting limited First Amendment protection to commercial speech for first time).
115. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central
Hudson set out a four-part test for analyzing commercial speech. First, the Court must
determine whether the commercial speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.
Second, the asserted government interest in regulating the speech must be substantial. Third,
if the first two prongs have been satisfied, the state must show that the regulation directly
advances the asserted governmental interest. Finally, the Court must determine that the
regulation is no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566.
116. 447 U.S. 557 (1976).
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speech have been upheld." 11 7 This does appear to be an area where, had
the right case-say Bigelow'"-appeared, the nationalizing Court would
have gotten there first.
The controversial extension of free speech has been in the campaign
finance area where many of the enthusiastic supporters of the nationalizing
era believe the Court erred in placing First Amendment limits on the ability
of government to restrict spending for elections.119 Buckley v. Valeo' 2° and
First National Bank v. Bellotti,"-' the two key culprits, struck down provi-
sions which varied from making it a criminal offense for any individual to
take out a newspaper ad on her own stating "Gerald Ford Pardoned Richard
Nixon. Say No to Him," to limiting the amount candidates could spend
toward their election, to precluding corporations from spending corporate
money to influence a referendum.
Campaign finance cases presented an issue untouched during the na-
tionalizing era. Like affirmative action, the cases pitted liberty interests'
22
against equality demands. Like affirmative action, the Court compromised,
allowing regulation of contributions but not spending. To have held oth-
erwise would have necessitated the Court in adopting some form of the
conclusion that the speech of certain individuals could be limited so that
the speech of others could be heard better. With the exception of Red
Lion'- and its embrace of broadcast scarcity, this had never been done,
and the Court found the principle "wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment." 1u Thus, while the Court had entered a new area, it had created no
new doctrine and had avoided the problem of whether there was a principled
stopping place."25
117. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff": Persuasion, Paternalism, and Com-
mercial Speech, 56 U. CN. L. Rav. 1205, 1230 (1988).
118. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
119. The certainty that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), would have come out
differently in the prior era is not entirely justified; Brennan and Stewart voted with the
majority on every issue with Marshall and White assuming (what would continue to be) the
lead in opposition. In the case of First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the
dissenting lineup-Brennan, Marshall, White, and Rehnquist-underscores that it was not the
normal case. Woodward and Armstrong also relate a story about the failing Douglas in one
of his lucid periods stating that no matter what his mental problems, he will know what to
do by doing the exact opposite of Burger. It is more than a little ironic that Burger (for
slightly different reasons) was the only Justice who voted as Douglas intended to vote in
Buckley-to strike down the whole act. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 391.
120. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that provisions limiting expenditures by candidates on
their own behalf violated First Amendment).
121. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (rejecting notion that expression loses First Amendment protection
merely because speaker is corporation).
122. While Bellotti may represent the special problem of corporations, the theory restricting
it is likely to apply to individuals as well. Compare Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker
Diversity, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 105 with L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Communications and the First
Amendment: An Overview, 55 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS. (1992) (forthcoming 1992).
123. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), discussed in L.A. PowE,
JR., AmzsmcAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST A.mENDmENT 37-44 (1987).
124. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
125. Compare Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 105 with
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"Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms
of First Amendment protection .... -126 Unfortunately, traditional public
forums-sidewalks and parks-are also verging on First Amendment ob-
solescence in our drive-to-the-mall nation. Yet the changes in society have
not been matched with changes in public forums. The Court has rejected
the possibility of new forums with such frequency that results are mired in
an era long since passed. The effect is that the Court has seemingly ignored
the problems of communication for the less affluent. Whether it is the
absurdity of requiring a stamp before putting a flier in a mail box, 127 or
denying teachers the use of school mail boxes, l2 or agreeing with Los
Angeles' claim that its aesthetic interests preclude use of utility poles for
campaign ads,' 29 the Court has refused to accommodate the needs of those
without access to radio, television, and newspapers. For a Court properly
concerned that the affluent not be limited in their speech opportunities,'30
the lack of concern for the less affluent therefore is shocking 3' and is a
distinct difference from the earlier era, which, while not perfect in its
protection of speech opportunities, at least held to a better symmetry.'
3 2
When National League of Cities v. Usery33 struck down the extention
of the minimum wage to municipal workers, Brennan's dissent cried out
that the majority obviously did not understand our constitutional order: the
federal government never loses an economic case. 3 4 Brennan rightly saw
National League of Cities as a change designed to favor state and local
authority in ways unimagineable for decades. Of course, National League
of Cities itself was interred nine years later. 3 5 Yet it was hardly a consti-
L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Communications and the First Amendment: An Overview, 55 LAW &
CoN mEp. PRoBs. (forthcoming 1992).
126. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
127. United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
128. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
129. Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984).
130. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
131. L.A. PowE, JR., THE FouRTH EsTATE AND THE CONSTrITTON: FREEDOM Op THE
PR s iN AM RCA 259 (1991).
132. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding that convictions of student
protestors who entered jail grounds with malicious intent, blocked vehicular travel on driveway
to jail not open to public, and refused to disperse upon sheriff's warning were not in violation
of First Amendment); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that
FCC order requiring radio station to furnish person attacked in broadcast with tape, transcript,
or summary of broadcast enhanced rather than infringed upon First Amendment freedom of
speech).
133. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
134. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The proper result, Brennan held, had been plain since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824). Id.
135. Garcia v. San Antonio Mun. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that transit
authority was not immune from minimum wage and overtime requirements). In what was
neither the most touching nor the most distinguished moment of his tenure, Powell mourned
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tutional virus ready to strike at the heart of democracy. It was a case that
had bad luck. Had the errand-boy treatment of state government displayed
in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978136 followed on National
League of Cities' heels instead of the absurd and traditional(ly losing) claim
of the Virginia strip mines, 37 then National League of Cities might have
lasted.
While the holding of National League of Cities did not last, its core-
new-found respect for state and local institutions, in some respects already
emerging in the jurisprudence following Black's "Our Federalism" of Younger
v. Harris138-fared vastly better139 than at any time since the New Deal
revolution. 14' The Eleventh Amendment, which had been suffering a long
erosion, was revitalized in Edleman v. Jordan14' to become a major obstacle
to suits against government. Most significant, however, was Stone v. Powel
42
and its signal that the regime of Fay v. Noia 143 was ending. Fay had been
part and parcel of the nationalization of criminal procedure. A renewed
deference to states-they seemed to win, instead of lose, every criminal
case-meant less second guessing of state courts. The deference went all
the way down to school boards (probably Powell's favorite beneficiary in
his respect for localism). 44 Of all the areas of jurisprudence, the paying of
respect to state and local institutions looked the least centrist and the most
for stare decisis and the decisions relying on National League of Cities. Id. at 557-58. If stare
decisis really had worried him, he should have been grieving for Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968), which upheld minimum wage requirements as constitutional, did not come out of
the blue, was 7-2, not 5-4, and had a mere eight year lifetime.
136. 92 Stat. 3117, sustained in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
137. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (up-
holding Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act as not violating Tenth Amendment).
138. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (refusing to enjoin state prosecution under unconstitutional
California Criminal Syndicalism Act).
139. The exception is FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), which sustained a
provision of PURPA that treated states as if they were bureaus of the Department of Energy.
140. One reason for the growing deference to states had to do with the changed selection
process for Justices. After Fortas and Marshall, not a single Justice had any significant national
political experience (viewing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund as part of the national governing
coalition). Indeed, by 1991 the idea of even local political experience had ended. Only O'Connor
had as much as run for dog catcher. Justices came from the states, with a tryout period in
the federal courts of appeals. I suspect this lack of political experience and, thus, support for
the branch of government that elevated them, are major factors in the Congress' dismal record
in separation of powers cases.
141. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred retroactive payment
of wrongfully withheld benefits).
142. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that where state granted opportunity for full claim,
state prisoner could not be granted habeus corpus relief on ground of unconstitutional search
and seizure).
143. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
144. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that cruel and unusual
punishment clause of Eighth Amendment did not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment
in public schools).
THE COURT BETWEEN HEGEMONIES
like the era of statist hegemony that would dawn following Powell's retire-
ment.
Iv
For over a third of a century following the New Deal's successful
revolution, the Court first genuflected toward whatever the federal govern-
ment did and then began on its own to create a constitutional law based
on the values of the northern elite. Somewhere around Roe and Keyes that
era ran its course, and, possibly encouraged by strong popular dissent not
limited to any given section of the country, a new era came into being.
Rodriguez typified the new area by its deferrential approach to local
institutions and its unwillingness to create and extend new constitutional
doctrine to solve emerging problems. When one compares the bulk of
Powell's tenure with what went before and what is coming after, the reason
for my title, The Court Between Hegemonies, becomes apparent: this was
a centrist era.
Vincent Blasi characterized the Burger Court in its 1969-81 period as
one of "rootless activism. ' 145 The catchy title of this famous essay is backed
up well by his reasons, and the reader will likely remember the title and
conclusion well after the specifics of his argument have been forgotten. His
specifics, however, comport well with my own conclusion that the era
following Roe was one largely dedicated to the constitutional status quo.
Thus, he begins his essay by stating that the Court solidified activism by
its failure to overrule either the front line or second tier landmark precedents
from the Warren Court. 146 Furthermore, rootless activism is centrist: "In
other words, in the hands of the Burger Court judicial activism has become
a centrist philosophy-dominant, transcending most ideological divisions,
but essentially pragmatic in nature, lacking a central theme or an agenda."' 47
I agree. But the Court does not need an agenda, and charges of activism
are too much a relic of process jurisprudence with its presumed correctness
of a single given way of thinking.1" There is nothing inherently wrong with
centrist activism, and my guess is that many of its critics will soon like it
a lot better as they digest the results of the new hegemony which is likely
(at least initially) to find constitutional violations only in affirmative action.
Centrist activism, rootless or otherwise, cannot be neatly characterized;
145. Blasi, supra note 3, at 198.
146. Blasi, supra note 3, at 199. Blasi's second introductory point is that the Burger Court
in 13 years invalidated 24 federal statutes compared to the 19 the Warren Court took out in
its 16 years. Id. at 200. My view of the earlier era as one of nationalizing values complete
with following the lead of the federal government anticipates that during that era the Court
would be more differential to federal legislation.
147. Blasi, supra note 3, at 211.
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nevertheless, there is much to be said for paraphrasing Douglas Laycock's
summation of the Court and religion: "[P]erhaps, in general, the Court
believes that a little bit of government [involvement in our lives] is unob-
jectionable."'' 49 Powell, one suspects, would not be uncomfortable with such
a characterization of either his era or his decisions. Like Brennan in his
younger days 50 and Rehnquist on the current Court, Powell, the centrist
Virginia patrician, seems to have been cast for the era in which he served,
a fleeting period between two very different hegemonies.
149. The paraphrase of Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United
States, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 409, 446 (1986), is his own, offered to me in comments on an earlier
draft of this essay.
150. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 9 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 11
(1991).
